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Earlier studies have shown that when individuals recall an emotional memory while simul-
taneously doing a demanding dual-task [e.g., playingTetris, mental arithmetic, making eye
movements (EM)], this reduces self-reported vividness and emotionality of the memory.
These effects have been found up to 1 week later, but have largely been confined to self-
report ratings.This study examined whether this dual-tasking intervention reduces memory
performance (i.e., accessibility of emotional memories). Undergraduates (N =60) studied
word-image pairs and rated the retrieved image on vividness and emotionality when cued
with the word.Then they viewed the cues and recalled the images with or without making
EM. Finally, they re-rated the images on vividness and emotionality. Additionally, fragments
from images from all conditions were presented and participants identified which fragment
was paired earlier with which cue. Findings showed no effect of the dual-task manipula-
tion on self-reported ratings and latency responses. Several possible explanations for the
lack of effects are discussed, but the cued recall procedure in our experiment seems to
explain the absence of effects best. The study demonstrates boundaries to the effects of
the “dual-tasking” procedure.
Keywords: dual taxation, memory accessibility, reaction time task, working memory, visual imagery
INTRODUCTION
Eye movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR) is an
evidence-based treatment for posttraumatic stress disorder (1–
3). In EMDR, patients are asked to recall traumatic mem-
ories while they simultaneously make eye movements (EM).
Although EMDR’s scientific and practical value was questioned
at first (4), EMDR has proven to be as effective as trauma-
based cognitive-behavioral therapy [For meta-analyses, see, e.g.,
Ref. (5, 6)].
For a long time, it has been controversial whether making EM
while recalling the distressing memory added anything to the
procedure (7). A recent meta-analysis of clinical and laboratory
studies on the role of EM has shown that EM during recall of
negative memories do have additional effects (8). For laboratory
studies, this additive effect is evident by larger reductions in subjec-
tive vividness and emotionality ratings of the distressing memory
for recall+ EM conditions, compared to a control condition in
which participants merely recall the memory (i.e., recall only).
Clinical studies have mainly found effects of EM on Subjective
Units of Distress. There are some findings of EM effects on Sub-
jective Units of Distress combined with symptom measures, such
as the Impact of Events Scale [see Ref. (8)].
The effectiveness of EM in EMDR can be explained by dual
taxation of the limited resources of working memory [WM, e.g.,
Abbreviations: EM, eye movements; EMDR, eye movement desensitization and
reprocessing; WM, working memory.
Ref. (9)]. This dual taxation takes place when an individual
recalls a distressing memory while also performing a secondary
task, such as making EM, mental arithmetic, or drawing complex
figures. When individuals perform the secondary task and simul-
taneously recall a memory, both tasks compete for scarce WM
resources. During this competition, the distressing memory can-
not be retrieved completely (i.e., gets blurred) and is stored as
a blurred memory after this competition. As a consequence, the
blurred memory will be retrieved during future recalls. Presently, a
body of evidence supports the WM hypothesis [e.g., Ref. (10–12);
for review, see Ref. (13)]. The vast majority of studies have shown
that dual taxation of WM blurs autobiographical memories [see
Ref. (8, 13)], with a few exceptions, such as pictures (9, 14) and a
film clip (15).
Most studies on the effects of recall+ EM focused on changes
in the subjective ratings of the experienced memory [e.g., Ref. (10,
16, 17)]. Therefore, the effects of EM in these studies could still,
in part, be the effect of demand characteristics; inferences par-
ticipants make based on what they think the researcher expects
(11). Thus, it remains unclear whether changes in subjective rat-
ings are the result of an experimental manipulation per se or of
unconscious or conscious alterations in the participants’ behav-
ior to fit the hypothesis. Gunter and Bodner (11) showed that
simultaneous recall+ EM reduced subjective ratings, while mak-
ing EM after memory recall did not produce these reductions. This
seems to forestall the conclusion that demand characteristics ful-
fill a large role in the effects of EM, because if they did, both
conditions should yield similar results. Nevertheless, objective
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memory measures could preclude the demand characteristics
account even further.
To date, however, little attention has been devoted to objectively
measure memory accessibility. Yet,WM theory predicts blurring of
memories that are recalled under dual taxation conditions. This
reduces its accessibility, because it is harder to access a blurred
memory.Van den Hout et al. (18) attempted to objectively measure
alterations in memory vividness with a reaction time (RT) task.
In their experiment, participants studied two “neutral” pictures,
though the pictures were not rated for emotional valence. One
picture was followed by recall+ EM and the other was followed by
recall only. In the RT task, participants performed old/new recog-
nition on cut-outs taken from both pictures and cut-outs from
never studied pictures. The rationale for using cut-outs was that
comparing a picture cut-out with a blurred memory of that same
picture takes more time, than a non-blurred memory. Van den
Hout et al. (18) showed that in the Recall+ EM condition – but
not in the recall only condition – a reduction in vividness rat-
ings was accompanied by an increase in RTs: participants were
slower in deciding whether they had seen the fragments before.
Therefore, RTs seem suitable as an objective behavioral measure
to assess the effects of memory blurring by EM. Notably, in a dif-
ferent paper (14), the question arose whether the allegedly neutral
pictures from Van den Hout et al. (18) were truly neutral. As an
annex, in the discussion of the later paper, the two pictures of Van
den Hout et al. (18) were rated and it was observed that the pic-
tures were hedonically positive. It is not self-evident that the effect
of reduced accessibility of emotionally positive stimuli generalizes
to negative materials.
While traumatic memories may seem to occur out of the blue,
they are often activated by environmental cues (19). Therefore, the
blurring of emotional memories needs to be placed in perspective.
According to cognitive theories about posttraumatic stress disor-
der, traumatic memories are not contained in a vacuum, they can
be activated by external cues. For instance, Brewin (20) argued
that certain cues reminiscent of the traumatic experience can acti-
vate memory presentations that are otherwise inaccessible. Ehlers
and Clark (21) make a comparable statement, namely, that invol-
untary intrusive visual memories are triggered by stimuli that are
temporally associated with the trauma, but are not strongly seman-
tically related to the event. Through an associative learning process
these stimuli and trauma become connected, and as a consequence
the stimulus becomes a warning signal: a stimulus that signals
imminent danger (22).
Though it is apparent that traumatic memories are not iso-
lated memories, it is currently unclear whether the effects of EM
(i.e., reductions in subjective ratings and in memory accessibil-
ity) will be found when a reminder cue is presented. On the one
hand, it is easier to remember episodic information in cued recall
than in non-cued recall [e.g., Ref. (23)]. On the other hand, cues
are frequently not uniquely encoded with one memory, which
may make it difficult to recall a specific memory instantly. Fur-
thermore, reduced subjective ratings do not necessarily have to
co-occur with reduced accessibility, because declarative memory
and memory for learning associations (i.e., conditioning) can be
dissociated (24). To illustrate this point, patients with posttrau-
matic stress disorder may display trouble with intentional recall of
aspects of the trauma memory, while cue-driven triggers lead to
intrusive re-experiencing of that memory (21).
Inaccessibility of episodic memories has frequently been stud-
ied with the Think/No-Think paradigm (25). In this task, partici-
pants first learn cue-target word pairs. They then repeatedly recall
the target for “think items” when seeing the cue, or stop target
retrieval for “no-think items.” For one-third of the items (base-
line items), there is no recall or retrieval-stopping. Afterwards,
memory for all pairs is assessed and generally a part of the cued
no-think items – compared to baseline items – have become inac-
cessible [see Ref. (26) for a review]. Evidently, the accessibility of
cued episodic memories can be affected.
The main aim of the current study was to replicate and extend
the study of Van den Hout et al. (18) to negative memories.
We tested whether recall+ EM affect the accessibility of asso-
ciative emotionally negative memory representations. Studies on
the effects of dual taxation on memory typically use negative
autobiographical memories. However, given that autobiograph-
ical memories are by their very nature hard to control and that
positive effects have also been found with self-irrelevant mem-
ories for pictures shown in the laboratory [e.g., Ref. (18)], we
decided to use memories of aversive pictures instead. We exam-
ined whether accessibility of emotional memories is affected when
those memories are activated via reminder cues. We used these
reminder cues as an experimental analog of the often cued nature
of trauma intrusions. Additionally, we attempted to objectively
measure memory blurring with a response latency task. To achieve
our aim, we adapted the frequently used Eye Movements Task by
incorporating elements from the think/no-think paradigm and
reasoned that associative accessibility, measured by RT following
a reminder cue, should be reduced for recall+ EM compared to a
recall only or to no-presentation control. Additionally, parallel to
this RT reduction, we expect memory blurring in terms of reduc-
tions in self rated vividness and emotionality of the emotionally
negative memory.
ETHICS STATEMENT
The research reported in this article involved healthy human
participants, and did not utilize any invasive techniques, sub-
stance administration, or psychological manipulations. It was
conducted according to the principles expressed in the Declara-
tion of Helsinki. The sample size was set before data collection
and written informed consent of each participant was obtained.
In giving consent, participants indicated to have read and to have
agreed with both the rules regarding participation and proper
(laboratory) behavior, and the researchers’ commitments and pri-
vacy policy. They were also informed that they would be able to
stop participating in the experiment whenever they wanted to do
so. After consent, participants were randomly allocated to condi-
tions and all gathered data were analyzed anonymously. Afterwards
participants were debriefed.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixty-two undergraduates of Utrecht University (M= 22.12 years,
SD= 3.16; 45 females, 17 males) participated for course credit
or financial reimbursement. Two participants were excluded (one
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because of sudden illness, another because of EMDR knowledge
prior to the experiment), resulting in a sample of 60 participants.
MATERIALS
Words
In this paradigm, participants studied word-image association
pairs that were divided over recall+ EM, recall only, and con-
trol. For these pairs, 12 neutral Dutch words and two filler words
(bean, caterpillar, chip, clock, gate, hawk, iron, mill, nail, plum,
reptile, spleen, stamp, and wind) with moderate levels of arousal
were selected from Moors et al. (27) (M valence= 4.08, SD= 0.15;
M arousal= 3.59, SD= 0.41; words were rated on a scale from 1
very negative/passive to 7 very positive/active). Filler were used as
buffers at the beginning and end of lists to avoid primacy and
recency effects. Importantly, the three experimental conditions
were matched on ratings of valence and arousal, as well as on rat-
ings of word length, word frequency, power, and age of acquisition.
The latter two referred to the extent to which a word is submis-
sive/dominant, and to the estimated age a word was first learned.
We used neutral words as a model of cued trauma recall.
Frequently, objects or situations that are associated with trauma –
because of their temporal proximity – are of neutral valence (e.g.,
a bank in case of a bank robbery). A second reason to use neutral
words instead of negative words was to avoid inter-pair associ-
ations as much as possible (i.e., associations other than those
between the word and image of a pair). Because negative materials
stem from a small number of categories (e.g., death, disease), they
are related to each other quickly. Since, the use of negative images
was crucial, use of negative words would rapidly increase inter-pair
associations. Moreover, we made sure cue words were not related
to other cue words in the stimulus set with the association database
from the University of Leuven: www.kuleuven.be/semlab.
Images
In a pilot study, participants (N = 24) rated 52 potentially neu-
tral and 52 potentially negatively valenced images from IAPS (28)
and Google Image. Pictures were rated with the Self-Assessment
Manikin [SAM; (28)] on a nine-point rating scale, where nine
represents a high score on each dimension, and one represents a
low score. From the pilot data, 12 images (and two filler images)
with the lowest valence and highest arousal ratings were selected
(M valence= 2.29, SD= 0.53; M arousal= 6.2, SD= 0.85). Five IAPS
images were selected (2053, 6313, 6821, 9433, and 9911) and seven
Google Image Pictures depicting a bullfighter attacked by a bull; an
anorexic woman looking in the mirror; masked soldiers carrying
guns and explosives; the hanging of two men; elephants killed by
poachers; and a man who set himself on fire. Images had a land-
scape orientation and were of the same size (500× 375 pixels).
For the final test, each image was divided into four equally sized
cut-outs (250× 187 pixels).
Visual analog scale
Participants rated the dependent variables vividness, emotion-
ality, difficulty to retrieve the memory of the target scene, and
degree of confidence in their decision (“choice confidence”; see
end of Section “Response Latency Task”) on a visual analog
scale (VAS) from 0 (not vivid/emotional/difficult/certain at all) to
100 (very vivid/emotional/difficult/certain). Choice confidence was
added as a novel outcome measure, because correct target image
identification in forced choice can be independent of choice confi-
dence. Decreases in confidence are an extremely robust finding of
research on obsessive–compulsive disorder in our laboratory [e.g.,
Ref. (29)].
Response latency task
Four cut-outs were taken from each picture (48 cut-outs in total).
Participants were asked to identify which cut-out had been paired
earlier with the cue word presented on screen. They consecu-
tively rated their choice confidence. The cue was displayed for
1000 ms followed by four cut-outs presented in four quadrants
around the cue. The correct cut-out belonging to the target image
had to be selected within 4000 ms by pressing the button on the
numerical keypad that corresponded with the cut-out’s location
on screen. To avoid learning from novelty elimination, three other
cut-outs displayed parts from images that had been used as tar-
gets for other cues. There was one pseudo-randomized order set,
wherein the total serial position for each condition was identi-
cal, and no more than two cues from the same condition were
displayed consecutively. Response latency was measured as depen-
dent variable. Additionally, participants rated how confident they
were their answer was correct (400 ms intertrial interval; ITI).
Post-experimental questions
Participants rated on paper-and-pencil VAS to what extent they
were compliant with and had been able to follow the instructions,
which was used as a manipulation check. For recall+ EM and
recall only they rated to what extent they made EM, were able to
recall the cued target memory, and how vivid and detailed that
memory was.
PROCEDURE
Learning phase
Initially, all cue-target pairs – consisting of a word and image – were
presented in the middle of a black screen for 8000 ms followed by
400 ms ITI. The display time was taken from Depue, Banich, and
Curran (30) and was doubled,because participants were instructed
not only to associate cue and target but also to be able to recall the
target image as complete and detailed as possible when seeing the
cue. Based on a pilot, participants indicated that this display time
was sufficient to comply with instructions. Next, participants saw
the cue word for 1000 ms and were instructed to select the correct
target image for each cue from four image options presented in
four quadrants around the cue. Three images displayed scenes that
were targets of other cues. Cue and image options disappeared after
4000 ms or after target selection. The maximum decision time was
based on a pilot, in which all decisions made by participants were
within 4000 ms. The correct target was highlighted by presenting a
green rectangle around the correct target for 2000 ms followed by
400 ms ITI (31) regardless of the participant’s answer. When par-
ticipants correctly selected 11 out of 12 experimental targets, they
proceeded to the learning test. They had up to six list repetitions to
achieve this criterion. All participants reached this criterion within
six repetitions.
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Learning test
In the learning test (pre-test), participants were presented with a
cue word and retrieved the accompanying target as vividly and
detailed as possible, and pressed the spacebar when they did. They
then rated the memory of the retrieved target on vividness, emo-
tionality, and difficulty of retrieval. Next, the cue was presented
a second time for 1000 ms, and the participant had to select the
correct target from four scenes within 4000 ms. Contrary to the
learning phase, no feedback was provided. After each decision, par-
ticipants rated how confident they were their answer was correct
(400 ms ITI). After participants completed the learning test for all
cues, they proceeded to the EM phase.
Eye movement phase
Participants were instructed to retrieve and visualize the target
as vividly and detailed as possible after a cue was presented. For
one-third of the cues, participants were instructed to simultane-
ously follow a dot of 20 pixel that moved laterally with their eyes
(1 Hz frequency and 461 pixel amplitude) for 4 intervals of 24 s
separated by 5-s breaks (“Recall+ EM”). For another third of the
cues, the same procedure was used except that participants did not
perform a secondary task, but simply looked at the center of the
screen while thinking of the target (“Recall Only”). The final third
of the cues were not presented in this phase and served as “nat-
ural decay” control condition. The duration of the experimental
manipulations was identical to previous studies [see Ref. (13)]. In
total, eight cues were presented in this phase and no more than two
cues with the same instruction were given in a row. Word pairs were
rotated through conditions over participants. After the 4× 24 s of
the eighth cue, participants continued with the final test phase.
Final test phase
Memory for all experimental items was assessed in the final test
(post-test). Participants were presented with the cue and were
instructed to retrieve the memory of the image associated with the
target. They then rated vividness and emotionality of the memory
of the retrieved target, and did this for all cues before continuing to
latency response task. After the latency response task, participants
filled-out the post-experimental questionnaire.
RESULTS
Data with more than three SD from the mean were corrected.
(Results for data with and without outlier correction were com-
parable.) Moreover, in order to retain sufficient power, slight
violations of sphericity were corrected with Greenhouse–Geisser
(0.70≥ ε< 0.75) or Huynh–Feldt corrections (ε≥ 0.75). In case
of severe violations (ε< 0.70) a multivariate test statistic (Pillai–
Bartlett trace; V ) is reported. Analyses were performed only on
pairs for which participants recalled the target on the final learning
test. Table 1 presents means and SD of the self-report ratings for
the three conditions.
MANIPULATION CHECKS
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that there were no
differences between conditions on difficulty of retrieval, F(2,
118)= 1.56, p= 0.21, η2p = 0.03, indicating comparable levels
of recall before entering the EM phase.
On the post-experimental questions, participants indicated
that they frequently made EM during recall+ EM (M = 83.77,
SD= 14.58), and rarely during recall only (M = 13.87,
SD= 18.68), t (59)= 18.79, p< 0.001, d = 4.2. They were bet-
ter able to recall the memory of the image during recall only
(M = 80.63, SD= 15.40) compared to recall+ EM (M = 64.78,
SD= 24.36), t (59)= 4.91, p< 0.001, d = 0.78. Additionally, the
recalled image was more vivid and detailed during recall only
(M = 72.35, SD= 18.50) compared to recall+ EM (M = 52.25,
SD= 24.15), t (59)= 6.56, p< 0.001, d = 0.96.
VIVIDNESS
A 2 (Pre, Post)× 3 (recall+ EM, recall only, control) ANOVA
showed no significant main or interaction effects for vividness
ratings, Fs< 1.90, ps> 0.17, η2p < 0.04.
EMOTIONALITY
A 2 (Pre, Post)× 3 (recall+ EM, recall only, control) ANOVA
did not reveal significant main or interaction effects, Fs< 2.23,
ps> 0.13, η2p < 0.04.
CONFIDENCE
Because confidence ratings related to complete images before the
experimental manipulation and to partial images after the manip-
ulation, the former were entered as covariates in an ANCOVA. Pre-
manipulation confidence ratings for recall+ EM, F(1, 56)= 17.38,
p< 0.001, η2p = 0.24, and for control, F(1, 56)= 11.87, p= 0.001,
η2p = 0.18, related significantly to post-manipulation confi-
dence ratings. There was no relation between pre-manipulation
recall only scores and post-manipulation ratings, F < 1. The main
analysis of condition on post-manipulation ratings showed no
effect when controlling for the pre-experimental confidence rat-
ings, F(1.672, 93.641)= 0.17, p= 0.80, η2p = 0.003 (Huynh–Feldt
correction).
Table 1 | Means and SD (in parentheses) of difficulty, confidence, vividness, and emotionality ratings for the recall+EM, recall only, and control
conditions.
Difficulty Confidence Vividness Emotionality
Pre Post Pre Post
Recall+EM 29.85 (16.82) 89.90 (11.6) 72.30 (14.22) 73.90 (16.59) 55.16 (16.23) 53.99 (19.04)
Recall only 31.21 (15.68) 89.05 (10.88) 70.77 (14.25) 73.59 (14.74) 51.05 (20.13) 53.07 (17.46)
Control 33.78 (17.93) 88.90 (12.05) 70.74 (14.72) 71.27 (15.28) 50.43 (19.74) 53.16 (19.68)
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RESPONSE LATENCIES
Before analyses, response latencies were log transformed because
of natural skewness in scores. Similar to confidence rat-
ings, response latencies related to complete images before the
experimental manipulation and to partial images after the manip-
ulation. Therefore, pre-manipulation response latencies were
entered as covariates in an ANCOVA. Pre-manipulation response
latencies for recall only, F(1, 56)= 6.70, p= 0.012, η2p = 0.11,
related significantly to post-manipulation response latencies.
Other pre-manipulation response latencies did not, Fs< 3.10,
ps> 0.08, η2p < 0.06. The main analysis for post-manipulation
response latencies, though, did not reach significance when con-
trolling for pre response latencies, F(2, 112)= 0.7, p= 0.5, η2p =
0.01. Table 2 presents means and SD.
ACCURACY
Participants needed, on average, 1.77 (SD= 1.30) repetitions to
achieve the learning criterion. Because analyses were performed
only on pairs for which participants recalled the target on the
final learning test, pre-manipulation scores for accuracy reached
the ceiling (100% for all conditions). Therefore, for accuracy, an
ANOVA was performed on post-manipulation scores only (see
Table 2). Participants did not differ in their accuracy to select the
correct target images for the different conditions, F(2, 118)= 0.45,
p= 0.64, η2p = 0.007.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to test whether recall+ EM affect the
accessibility of associative memory representations when emo-
tionally negative materials are used. In this extended replication
of Van den Hout et al. (18), we found no blurring of the emo-
tional memory representations for recall+ EM compared to recall
only or no intervention. This was reflected in the absence of any
effects on subjective ratings of vividness and emotionality, and
also in objective measures of memory accessibility, specifically
latency responses. Participants reported they had complied with
the instruction to make EM. They also reported that mental images
were less vivid, less detailed, and more difficult to retrieve during
the intervention. However, this seems trivial, because these effects
did not persist at the post-test.
The data show no reductions in memory accessibility, but they
do not necessarily falsify WM theory as an explanation for the
effects of dual taxation. The absence of effects may be a con-
sequence of our materials. Could the data have been different
if self-relevant or less negative pictures would have been used?
The vast majority of earlier studies on the effects of demanding
secondary tasks have used personally relevant, autobiographical
memories [e.g., Ref. (10, 11, 32)], while our study used novel
Table 2 | Means and SD (in parentheses) of response latencies and
accuracy for recall+EM, recall only, and control conditions.
Response latencies Accuracy
Recall+EM 1268.7 (310) 0.97 (0.06)
Recall only 1292.4 (383.8) 0.96 (0.07)
Control 1280.9 (324.6) 0.97 (0.06)
emotional images. These images could have lacked the poten-
tial to elicit sufficient levels of arousal, which may be necessary
in the dual-tasking procedure to reduce vividness (Littel et al.,
submitted). Van den Hout et al. (14) showed that only negative
autobiographical memories – which are associated with transient
levels of arousal – were reduced in their vividness ratings, while
neutral memories were not. This suggests arousal is a prerequi-
site for (re-)encoding of memories after dual taxation. Although
our materials were not negative autobiographical memories, they
were, however, thoroughly piloted and showed sufficient arousal
during the pilot and on pre-test measures. Moreover, other stud-
ies have used non-idiosyncratic materials and showed effects for
recall+ EM compared to recall only [e.g., Ref. (15)] and specif-
ically showed that effects can be found for materials that are
neither autobiographical nor self-relevant (9, 18). It therefore
seems unlikely that intrinsic qualities of our novel images per se
explain the absence of effects.
The tasks we used may also have limited the effects of dual tax-
ation. This study used a latency response task that was based on
a similar task in Van den Hout et al. (18). In their task, partici-
pants were instructed to react as fast and accurately as possible,
and had to decide whether a cut-out was old or new. In our
experiment, participants received comparable instructions. Yet,
they did not make an old-new judgment, but a source judgment:
they had to indicate which of the four displayed images was the
cue’s target. Though these tasks look similar, they probably draw
on different types of recognition: old-new recognition and source
recognition. Old-new recognition can generally be performed at
lower levels of item differentiation than source decisions (33). As
a consequence, slightly blurred recall+ EM pairs may show effects
for old-new decisions compared to recall only pairs, but not for
source decisions. It is possible that successful source memory dif-
ferentiation does occur when pairs from the recall+ EM condition
differ more in the level of memory blurring from the recall only
or no-presentation control conditions. Theoretically, it may be
possible to find differences between conditions when an old-new
recognition task is used instead of a source recognition task.
A different explanation may also be found in the response
latency task, specifically in the distractors that were used as tar-
gets in previous trials. During the final part of the experiment,
participants had to select the correct target out of four cut-out
images. Here, the use of distractors that have been used as targets in
previous trials may cause response inhibition, and related response
delays. Alternatively, it is also possible that the blurring effects were
abolished, when participants specifically saw recall+ EM images
as distractors in earlier trials, and in later trials saw these same
images as targets. As a consequence, the image could have been
reinstated in full and any condition effects were abolished as well.
This does not, however, explain why there were no effects on any
of the subjective ratings, which preceded the response latency task.
Though, it might be possible that the effects of recall+ EM in our
design were subtle and only detectable with RT, but that this effect
was abolished by how our response latency task was designed. Fur-
thermore, emotional interference may have played a role, because
participants had to select one out of four highly unpleasant images,
which may have caused response delays that are not due to simple
blurring or retrieval delay. Indeed, it cannot be ruled out that there
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might be a floor effect in that the delay is beyond the critical point
where retrieval differences can be found.
Though several plausible explanations for the lack of effects can
be found in the response latency task, it still leaves unanswered why
subjective ratings of the images did not change, because these rat-
ings preceded the latency response task, and were recalled without
seeing any of the targets from other pairs. Perhaps cued recall of the
to-be-recalled material influenced the effectiveness of dual taxa-
tion. On the one hand, cued recall could facilitate episodic memory
retrieval compared to non-cued recall (23), and thus should allow
the participant to vividly retrieve the associated target image.
This is reflected in relatively low pre-test scores for self-assessed
difficulty of retrieval and high scores for vividness. Subsequent
retrieval of a vividly cued image should therefore be blurred as
a consequence of dual taxation. This, however, did not happen.
On the other hand, even though participants quickly learned the
associations – which hints at strong relationships between cue
and target – these may simply not have been strong enough. We
used neutral words referring to objects that people may encounter
frequently in daily life and thus could be linked to various situa-
tions. Although the association between the cue and target is novel
and recent, it is unlikely that the cue’s path exclusively leads to the
target. Therefore, after images were cued in a recall+ EM trial, par-
ticipants may not have thought of the target image all the time, but
of other images, objects, or words. As a consequence, the target may
not have been sufficiently blurred and reductions in self-reported
vividness and emotionality may not have been experienced for
recall+ EM. Hence, generally cued recall may ameliorate mem-
ory, but not when a multipath cue needs to prompt one specific
target for prolonged periods of time. Additionally, this might also
explain why there were no latency response effects. If cues did
not elicit specific and continuous target retrieval, then differential
item blurring and successful source recognition could not have
occurred.
Provided that cued recall was primarily responsible for the
lack of effects, the question ensues whether dual taxation is able
to affect associative memory networks. A review of earlier stud-
ies showed that WM taxation, specifically EM, is able to reduce
subjective ratings of emotional memories when those memories
were recalled immediately after the intervention (8). The current
study showed that these memories were not changed subjec-
tively or objectively when cued with a memory reminder. Perhaps
this limitation signals a boundary condition for this paradigm
and limits the robustness of the dual taxation paradigm. Until
now, Van den Hout et al. (18) conducted the only study that
found effects of the EM intervention on objective measures of
memory accessibility, and it cannot be ruled out that this rep-
resents a chance finding. It should be noted that other studies
using objective measures of memory valence or emotionality have
shown effects after dual taxation, such as eye blink startle reflex
diminution (34), reduced heart rate variability (35), and decreased
electrodermal responses (36), but these objective measures pri-
marily related to arousal levels and not memory accessibility
per se.
If it does, however, signal a limitation of the dual taxation par-
adigm, then memory change under dual taxation conditions may
require a specific form of recall. This would imply that a mem-
ory must be directly recalled as opposed to memory recall that
is initially cued by reminders. The former has been frequently
used in previous work [e.g., Ref. (14)]. Interestingly, this does not
preclude the possibility of finding effects with cued recall. Cued
recall after dual taxation may still lead to reductions in subjective
ratings, but only if the memory is recalled directly during dual
taxation. This does, however, seem to contradict predictions from
current trauma theories (20, 21), which state that encountering
cues associated with an emotional memory could instantly trigger
vivid intrusions of that memory. In the current study, cues prob-
ably elicited retrieval of the target memory, but most likely only
briefly.
The lack of effect of cued recall also has implications for asso-
ciative network theories, in which connectivity between different
representations is paramount. A central tenet of network theories
is modifiability of the network’s structure after activation [e.g.,
Ref. (37)]. It is possible that small networks (e.g., two nodes repre-
senting only stimulus characteristics, such as gate – car accident)
are difficult to modify. Larger, more ecologically valid networks
typically also contain elements regarding responses (“panic”) or
meanings (“I am helpless”), next to mere stimulus relations. Per-
haps these former relations are an inherent changeable part of the
associative network, and also a part that does not need to be tar-
geted directly. It is possible that stimulus characteristics change
during dual taxation, and affect response and meaning elements,
which changes how a person feels or thinks about an event. As a
consequence, change in subjective experiences may be difficult to
accomplish in smaller, laboratory created networks because these
lack elements of meaning.
In sum, we found that EM during recall did not blur emotional
memory representations measured by subjective or objective mea-
sures of memory accessibility. Response inhibition and emotional
interference do not seem able to explain all the effects. Cued recall,
on the other hand may; it may not have been potent enough to
elicit specific and continuous target retrieval for differential item
blurring to occur. Although memory effects following EM were not
observed, it is unlikely – given the substantial body of evidence –
that reductions in self-reported ratings are a chance discovery.
Changes in objective measures of memory accessibility therefore
still need to pass the critical test of replication.
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